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FOREWORD 
 
The Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG1 
 
COPYRIGHT WILL CONTINUE 
Towards the end of this book, in his second contribution on national, regional and 
international perspectives of copyright, Professor Adrian Sterling shares with the 
reader an anecdote from his long career in the world of copyright law.2 
He describes the conclusion of the conference of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) in 1996, at which the WIPO treaties on copyright and related 
rights were approved. According to his recollection, the Director of WIPO at the time, 
Dr Arpad Bogsch, greeted him in what was to be their last meeting. Dr Bogsch 
declared: “Sterling, these treaties are only a step in the history of copyright. You and I 
will disappear, but copyright will continue”. Affirming that “Dr Bogsch was always 
right”, Adrian Sterling draws comfort and encouragement from this prediction.  
Partly in consequence of the exponential growth of technology in recent years (and 
especially the development of the internet), the challenges to copyright law, as it has 
evolved, are daunting. Traditionalists, even of the most devoted kind, must sometimes 
wonder how the fabric that they have built, and loved, can remain intact under the 
multiple assaults launched against it. Criticisms have been conceived in ideology, 
nurtured in politics and self-interest and delivered by a never-ending stream of 
technological changes. So it has been in the past thirty years. So it will probably be in 
the decades ahead. 
Just to show that miracles can still happen to retired judges, when I departed Barwick’s 
High Court building, I had no computer on my desk. Not far from the building could 
be seen the art deco elegance of Old Parliament House, Canberra. That was where the 
conference was held whose papers are collected in this book. Not long before I 
attended the conference, I could not open a computer, still less send an email or 
conduct a Google search. Well, necessity is not only the essential ingredient for an 
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implication that a statutory licence will be implied as a matter of law under the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)  s183 into a contract between a creator and its clients in 
favour of a State3, it is also the mother of a retiree’s inventiveness. So now, like more 
than a billion others of my species, I lock my mind every day into the internet. It trawls 
and searches through cyberspace, opening up original works of countless others, 
available for the most part free online.  
THE DYNAMIC OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
My newfound capacity with the internet has brought me into acquaintance with all the 
fashionable outlets, even YouTube. A video doing the rounds on this network reveals, 
amongst other things4: 
If you were one in a million in China, there would be 1300 people just like 
you.  
China will soon be the number one English-speaking nation on earth. 
The top ten in-demand jobs in 2010 did not even exist in 2004. 
One in eight couples in the United States who married in 2010 met on line. 
Every month in 2010, 31 billion searches were conducted using Google. In 
2006, the figure was 2.7 billion. 
The number of years that it took to reach a market of 50 million was: in the 
case of radio, 38 years; of television, 13 years; of the internet, 4 years; the 
iPod, 3 years; Facebook, 2 years.  
200 million users of Myspace, if they were a nation, would be fifth largest in 
the world, ranked between Indonesia and Brazil.  
The number of internet devices in 1984 was 1000. In 1992, a million. In 
2008, 1000 million. 
The amount of new technological information is doubling every two years. 
For students taking a four year technical degree, this means that half of what 
they have learned in their first year of study will be outdated by their third 
year of study.  
By 2013, a super computer will be built that exceeds the computational 
capacities of the human brain. Predictions are that by 2049, a $1,000 
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computer will exceed the computational capacity of the entire human 
species.  
During the course of this presentation, 67 babies were born in the US; 274 in 
China; 395 in India and 694,000 songs were downloaded illegally. 
From the point of view of experts in the law of copyright, the sting in the tail of this 
YouTube presentation (which lasted all of four minutes) was to be found in the 
concluding statistic. All of those worthy individuals and citizens, many of them 
children (some maybe even judges), are knowingly, ignorantly or indifferently finding 
themselves in breach of international and national copyright law. And they intend to 
keep on doing exactly as before.  
THE LEGAL AND THE ILLEGAL 
The fact that this is so and is of such little concern to so many, profoundly interests 
Professor Laurence Lessig, whose keynote address is featured in this book.5 Young 
people, especially, view remixes, for example, as a type of conversation. Just as in 
earlier days, young people sang the songs of the day, or old songs together. As 
Professor Lessig describes it: 
Instead of gathering in the corner, or on the back lawn, people from around 
the world are using this digital platform to engage in a form of read-write 
technology. 
Some activities of the new generations are unregulated by law. But some are definitely 
contrary to law. Just as in earlier generations, buying tea at Boston Harbour, upon 
which royal tax had not been paid, was contrary to law. Or just as adult private 
homosexual activity was (as it still is in many places) contrary to law. Or providing 
sterile injecting equipment to minimise the spread of HIV/AIDS was (and often still 
is) contrary to law. Law is not everything. But lawyers tend to consider that it is rather 
important that it should be obeyed and respected. Otherwise, if it is ignored or defied, 
that fact might bring down the whole edifice of the rule of law. 
In the same chapter, Adrian Sterling quotes the recent report Digital Britain as making 
this point:6 
In the new digital world, the ability to share content legally becomes ever 
more important and necessary … There is a clear and unambiguous 
distinction between the legal and illegal sharing of content which we must 
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urgently address. But we need to do so in a way that recognises that, when 
there is very widespread behaviour and social acceptability of such 
behaviour that is at odds with the rules, then the rules, the business models 
that the rules have underpinned and the behaviour itself, may all need to 
change … Our aim, in the rapidly changing digital world is a framework 
that is effective and enforceable, both nationally and across borders. But it 
must be one which also allows for innovation in platforms, devices and 
applications … 
How can international and national copyright law be changed to conform not just 
with the technology that is with us now, but with the amazing pace of technological 
expansion that is happening so fast that we cannot even imagine where we will be in a 
couple of decades? The slow-moving pace of legislative change, bureaucratic decisions 
and judicial opinion-writing makes it difficult, if not impossible, to cope with the 
current pace of technological innovation in informatics. And if this is true of 
municipal law, how much more true in the case of international law, where the 
economic, social, cultural and other diversities are such that consensus (with all its 
subtle nuances) can only be achieved through intensely time-consuming negotiations, 
trade-offs against competing interests and overcoming hurdles presented by countless 
obstacles? 
THE WARM EMBRACE OF SOFT LAW 
In my early days as chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission, I was 
introduced to the challenges of the impact of technology on the law in several of the 
projects of the Commission. They included the reports on human tissue 
transplantation7 and privacy.8 Thus, scientific developments suddenly helped to 
overcome the previous human immune rejection of transplants. And just as the 
Commission was about to deliver its report on transplantation law, a baby, Louise 
Brown, was born as a result of in vitro fertilisation. The use of foetal tissue already then 
loomed as a new challenge for gaining a local consensus over the shape that Australian 
law should take. Prudently, perhaps, the Commission elected to leave these issues 
aside, for separate attention. Safer by far to limit our recommendations to the 
transplantation of corneas and kidneys. A foetus seemed to raise different and more 
controversial questions. 
                                                             
7 Australian Law Reform Commission, Human Tissue Transplants, (ALRC 7, 1977). 
8 Australian Law Reform Commission, Privacy (ALRC 22, 1983), 206. 
6 
In the privacy report, the Commission recommended (and the Australian Parliament 
accepted9) certain ‘information privacy principles’ to guide decisions on the protection 
of privacy in the then new world of computer processing. These principles were, in 
turn, derived from a report of the Expert Group on Privacy of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) which I had chaired in Paris 
1978–80.10  
There was wisdom at that time in proceeding along the path earlier charted by “soft 
law”, in the form of the OECD Guidelines. This is a point that has been made in the 
context of copyright law by Professors Bernt Hugenholtz and Ruth Okediji, when 
conceiving a future international instrument on limitations and exceptions to 
copyright.11 Still, the dangers of soft law, when translated into the hard law of national 
statutory texts, was quickly demonstrated to the Australian Law Reform Commission 
by supervening advances in information technology. Suitable to the technology as it 
stood when the OECD report was completed (and endorsed by the Council of that 
organisation in 1980) was the ‘use limitation principle’. For protection of individual 
privacy, this principle limited the later use of [private] personal information to a use 
for which the information had earlier been [lawfully] collected or any other use to 
which the data subject had given consent or specific approval was granted by law. But 
with the advent of search engines, such as Google, that principle, at least in the terms 
originally expressed, became unsuitable, if not unworkable and probably unthinkable. 
So enormous were the utilities of the search engines that no-one could hope to turn 
back the clock.  
Although this meant the active use of information with personal identifiers for 
purposes other than those first given (necessarily some of it out-of-date and gathered 
for quite different and even alien purposes) the marginal utility of the facility of the 
search engine was far greater than the marginal cost in the loss of privacy or in any 
(futile) attempt to restore the old legal regime so as to apply to the new informatics. 
In this sense, therefore, the problem now faced by intellectual property lawyers in 
general (and copyright lawyers in particular), because of the advance of technology 
and the huge public engagement with it, is nothing new. What is new, as the report 
Digital Britain explains, is the “very widespread behaviour and social acceptability” 
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that comes in the train of the new technology and effectively demands the acceptance 
of a new legal paradigm.  
COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
What should that paradigm be? This is a question that recurs throughout the 
contributions collected in this book. Professors Hugenholtz and Okediji have pointed 
out that, certainly in our legal tradition of the common law”12 
It is a well-established principle of copyright doctrine that the qualified 
grant of proprietary rights over the fruits of creative enterprise is directed 
first and foremost at the promotion of the public interest. Most countries 
around the world explicitly recognise this vital goal as a foundational 
element of their copyright systems.13 Indeed, from the very first formal 
copyright law, the British Statute of Anne (1710), the encouragement of 
learning and dissemination and knowledge as a means to enhance the 
general welfare has been the chief objective behind the grant of exclusive 
rights to authors14. For over 100 years, this public-centred rationale of 
copyright protection has been recognised and clearly articulated in all major 
instruments for the global regulation of copyright15. The currently pre-
eminent Global Intellectual Property (IP) Treaty, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights16 (TRIPS) Agreement, concluded under 
the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994, recently 
reflected and re-affirmed this basic precept by describing the overarching 
objective of intellectual property protection under the Agreement as “the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge … 
conducive to social and economic welfare”17 
Yet, it is one thing to express, in general language, a commitment to “public interest”, 
“learning and dissemination of knowledge” and “mutual advantage”. It is often quite 
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another to translate these aspirational phrases into activities that are accepted by the 
several competing interests that are at stake. The competition of interests will include 
such practical concerns as respective economic advantages. They will offer perceptions 
of what is right, derived from legal history and doctrine that can differ quite markedly 
between nations. They will sometimes include a particular element offered by 
competing assertions of the requirements of international human rights law. Because 
this is an area of law with which I have had some involvement over three decades, I 
must refer to it in this context. 
THE NEW PARADIGM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The language of international human rights is not antagonistic to intellectual property 
protection. Providing legal protections for intellectual property (including patents of 
invention, trademarks and copyright) is by no means alien to the objectives of 
universal human rights. To the contrary, from the very start of the attempts in the 
post-Second World War era, to express and uphold universal human rights, a place 
has always existed for the defence of those interests that are conventionally safe-
guarded by intellectual property law.  
Thus, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights18 (UDHR), prepared in 1947–8 by 
a committee chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States of America (and 
brought into operation in the General Assembly of the United Nations by a vote over 
which an Australian, Dr. H.V. Evatt, presided), the following article was included: 
Article 27 
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author. 
The potential juxtaposition of, and tension between, the foregoing paragraphs was 
immediately noted. When the UDHR was transformed into a treaty, relevantly the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)19, the states 
parties to the treaty committed themselves to “achieving progressively the full 
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realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”.20 
Amongst the rights recorded in the ICESCR were: 
Article 15 
1. The States Parties to the present covenant recognise the right of everyone: 
(a) To take part in cultural life; 
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is 
the author. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present covenant to 
achieve the full realisation of this right shall include those necessary for the 
conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and culture. 
3. The States Parties to the present covenant undertake to respect the 
freedom indispensible for scientific research and creative activity. 
4. The States Parties to the present covenant recognise the benefits to be 
derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts 
and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields. 
Again, within the very same article, principles are stated that appear to pull in 
differing, and even opposite, directions, so far as the award of exclusive rights to 
creative authors is concerned. However, it is not always appreciated that international 
human rights law includes provisions expressly recognising and accepting the 
fundamental, universal and morally justifiable character of the nominated intellectual 
property rights.  
Of course, in the attainment of those rights, it is necessary to secure a reconciliation of 
each such right with the other rights provided elsewhere by international human rights 
law, according to their terms. Thus, the rights of some persons must be reconciled 
with those of others. The rights afforded by some articles of the human rights treaties 
must be reconciled with the rights of others under other treaties. Notably, in apparent 
competition with a provision such as that in Article 15 of the ICESCR are the 
following rights contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)21:  
Article 19 
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1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject 
to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law 
and are necessary:  
(a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), 
or of public health or morals.” 
Many of the contemporary debates about the shape and direction of international and 
national copyright law involve an endeavour to reconcile the foregoing rights. I am 
sure that some intellectual property lawyers, particularly those of a parochial kind who 
have never ventured outside their intellectual specialty, will have little sympathy for 
my mention of this backdrop of international human rights law. However, it is 
reassuring to see the attention given to the subject in this book by, amongst others, 
Adrian Sterling.22 Correctly, he invokes international human rights law to rebuff the 
more extreme assertions of IP-phobic commentators, calling for the abolition of IP 
protection altogether, or, at least, modification in relation to material freely available 
on the internet.23 
Just as reminders of the aspirational core value of “public interest” in copyright law 
can sometimes give little practical guidance to municipal lawyers or lawmakers, so 
appeals to the broad language of the UDHR or the ICESCR may sometimes send 
different signals to different minds, according to their susceptibility, backgrounds and 
interests.  
An important point has been made in this connection by Professors Graeme Austin 
and Amy Zavidow24 in an article on “Copyright Law Reform Through a Human Rights 
Lens”.25 Whilst accepting that international human rights law will not necessarily 
resolve the tensions between proponents and critics of copyright law, the authors 
suggest, for the purpose of reform (in my view correctly), that international law 
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affords unexplored territory, potentially useful for defenders of global copyright 
regimes. Moreover, Austin and Zavidow assert that:  
Debates about the domestic law reform agenda in the copyright field could 
be richer and more salient if they were accompanied by deeper engagement 
with public international law – both the public international law of 
intellectual property and international human rights law.  
This is an appeal that I would endorse. Unfortunately, it sometimes needs 
endorsement in countries, such as Australia and the United States, which tend to be 
rather parochial and even a tad self-satisfied about their law in general, and their 
intellectual property law in particular.  
DESTABILISING PREVIOUS BALANCES 
A special difficulty that is peculiar to the need, which international human rights law 
recognises, to reconcile competing human rights norms, is the fact that, in many 
countries, particularly in the developing world, there are inadequate provisions either 
in constitutional law or the domestic legal tradition and practice, to speak up for the 
right of access to information when it comes into conflict with intellectual property 
rights asserted by powerful commercial interests. This is a point which has been made 
by Professor Michael Birnhack in his article “Global Copyright, Local Speech”26. 
Birnhack argues that, whatever its original history, copyright law today is less a means 
of promoting progress in science (as the words of the United States Constitution 
proclaim) so much as protecting established national interests in the matter of trade. 
The TRIPS Agreement of the WTO has effectively produced a global copyright regime 
which, Birnhack concludes, has “de-stabilised previous balances”. He argues that the 
shift to a global trade environment requires an urgent re-evaluation of the previous 
balances, particularly because, in the face of expanding trade-related copyright, the 
competing norms of international human rights law (access to information, research 
and free speech) tend to be “left unattended”.  
Professor Birnhack argues that this result is especially true in developing countries, 
mostly with neither express nor effective constitutional provisions to uphold free 
speech and usually with inadequate political will to do so. In short, Birnhack’s special 
concern is about the effective imposition of copyright obligations, through TRIPS and 
bilateral free trade agreements, whereby, as he puts it, as “the trade benefits to The 
North have a cost in limiting access to information, use thereof and formation of new 
speech, or more generally, it has a cost in freedom, in The South”.  
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Not all writers in this field are as pessimistic as Professor Birnhack. Professors L.R. 
Helfer and G.W. Austin, in an excellent review: “Human Rights and Intellectual 
Property: Mapping the Global Interface”,27 conclude that the intersection of human 
rights and intellectual property law is now “unavoidable”.28 They classify the responses 
of lawyers in the field into four groups:  
 The first are those human rights lawyers who declare that, basically, IP law 
does not fit into the new world of human rights. By reference to the history 
and the texts of the UDHR and ICESCR, it is suggested that such opponents 
“understand the discourse of one complex legal and political system but not 
the other”.29  
 Secondly, they identify the IP protagonists who are deeply fearful of, and 
therefore hostile towards, international human rights law; proclaiming that it 
will “promote government intervention in private innovation markets and … 
radically scale back or even abolish IP protection”.30 They point out that this 
is simply not likely to happen in the real world.  
 The third category includes those lawyers from both camps who worry that 
the international legal system is being overly fragmented, so that it is difficult 
to acknowledge the competing values of human rights and IP. The authors 
accept that there is a specific problem of whether the current decision-makers 
within WTO, for example, “are adequately equipped” to mediate the 
conflicting values of international IP treaties and of human rights law31.  
 Finally, they themselves suggest a fourth approach, which they urge should be 
“empirically grounded”.32 That is, it should recognise that both human rights 
and IP legal regimes are continually evolving in response to changing 
conceptions of fundamental legal entitlements and technological progress. 
They point out that no empirical approach to that reconciliation of 
international law which will best protect the legitimate interests of all players 
will occur, without improvement in the process, transparency and 
predictability of the current techniques.33  
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TOWARDS A NEW RECONCILIATION 
In this connection, Professors Helfer and Austin make what seems to me to be a 
powerful point: 
A salient recent example is the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), a proposed multi-lateral treaty that would establish new and more 
robust obligations for states to suppress unauthorised uses of intellectual 
property. For two years, ACTA negotiations occurred in secret and 
governments refused to disclose an official draft text of the treaty. Only after 
a French civil rights NGO leaked the document revealing “contradictions 
between the text and public comments by [government] negotiators” did 
governments release an official text. This lack of transparency involving 
potentially far-reaching changes to domestic and international intellectual 
property laws and enforcement mechanisms is disturbing, as is the inability 
of interested constituencies to, in the words of the Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights, “take part in … any significant decision-making 
processes that have an impact on their rights and legitimate interests.34 
Whilst secrecy on the part of powerful national interests (doubtless egged on by the 
sometimes even more powerful interests of transnational corporations) may be 
understandable, it is intolerable as a matter of global policy and principle. It may itself 
be a breach of international human rights norms. Little wonder that many observers of 
international copyright law, and of its current directions and indecisions, are 
suspicious and antagonistic. Nevertheless, Professors Helfer and Austin, make very 
useful suggestions. It is essential to know exactly how in practice the current 
international regimes operate. There is no doubt that intellectual property protections 
are still useful and justifiable in principle. Moreover, in the international context, they 
have the support of express provisions in international human rights law itself.  
At the end of their analysis, Professors Helfer and Austin conclude in words that I 
would endorse:35 
[T]here may be no incompatibility if individuals retain the right to be 
acknowledged as creators and to receive remuneration for at least some 
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uses. The more fundamental point, however, is that although creators and 
innovators do indeed possess a narrow class of inalienable economic and 
personality rights, they can choose how best to exercise those rights so as to 
construct a zone of personal autonomy that is both self-empowering and 
conducive to the broader public values that the human rights framework for 
IP seeks to achieve. 
Those broader frameworks will include creative commons, incentives designed to 
reduce poverty, disease, misgovernment and other afflictions as well as limitations and 
exceptions to copyright protection, yet to be worked out. 
The working out is, of course, a major enterprise. It will not happen overnight. Indeed, 
it will not happen any time soon. But a step in the right direction is to collect the 
informed experts. To encourage amongst them a constructive clash of opinions. To lift 
the thinking of all so as to take them outside their comfort zones, shaped by current 
international and municipal law and perceptions of past practice and present national 
interests. And to stimulate bold and inventive thinking.  
THE URGENCY OF LAW REFORM  
This was the objective of the conference convened at Old Parliament House, Canberra 
on the 40th anniversary of Australia’s Copyright Act of 1968. It is what makes this 
book, collecting those proceedings, so interesting, topical and valuable. It is all here. 
Anecdotes. Analysis. History. Optimism. Pessimism. Ways forward. Scepticism. 
Hostility. Infatuation. Fierce reformism. And passionate defence of the status quo. The 
editors and organisers deserve praise. But, the greatest reward for the contributors will 
be if this book helps to stimulate consideration of law reform, both at an international 
and national level. 
     
Michael Kirby 
February 2011 
